Abstract: This paper begins with the paradoxes that accrue around the appearance of Robinson Crusoe and his "Man Friday" within recent judgments relating to the Chagos Archipelago. These references are understood as revealing the complex of anxieties and limits that are the final legacy of these rulings. In particular, we trace the ways in whichthrough Daniel Defoe's iconic characters -these judgments enact a troubling retreat from review of executive action, and a fuller withdrawal of sensibility from situations of "otherness" that both bear and cannot bear analogy to that of Friday. The paper then more briefly considers a similar complex of anxieties and limits, retreats and withdrawals enacted by recent judgments relating to Australian territory in the Indian Ocean. This allows us to suggest that between these two series of highest court rulings, the Anglophone common law is currently constructing the Indian Ocean as an offshore: a site excised from judicial review, and a site in which certain figures -peoples, individuals -are not considerable in both senses of the word. But in fathoming this, we turn to Derrida's insights on sovereignty to argue that, far from being new, this construction of a common law of the Indian Ocean tells us about the affront of an archaic sovereignty that always already determines and is determined by law.
<A>INTRODUCTION
In a world of chance, is there a better or a worse? We yield to a stranger's embrace or give ourselves to the waves; for the blink of an eyelid our vigilance relaxes; we are asleep; and when we awake, we have lost the direction of our lives. What are these blinks of an eyelid, against which the only defence is an eternal and inhuman wakefulness? Might they not be the cracks and chinks through which another voice, other voices, speak in our lives? By what right do we close our ears to them? 1 In The Nomos of the Earth Carl Schmitt characterizes nomos as the "first measure of all subsequent measures." 2 Nomos is linked to the first land appropriations, the partition and classification of space, and to primeval divisions and distributions. 3 For Schmitt nomos is what gives a spatially concrete unity by which a people or tribe becomes settled or historically situated; becomes visible in the appropriation of land during the founding of a city or colony. 4 Schmitt compares nomos to the English term "radical title" (to be treated as original spatial ordering). 5 Nomos also has a future. There will be perpetually new manifestations of nomos when space is apportioned in every historical epoch. 6 This is not to say that Schmitt offers an account of nomos adequate for all time.
[AQ2]<fig 1>
Schmitt has become a handy source of blinding paradigms and binary oppositions.
Norm and exception, friend and foe, land and sea have all come to mark contemporary legal and political analyses with a seemingly timeless logic. These frameworks have become a feature of engagements with neo-imperialism, the "new world order," "post 9/11," and the "war on terror." Taking turns at rounding a corner of history and marking it as a paradigm shift seems to be what is at stake in deploying concepts that formulaically stand in for saying that "everything is different now." We are regularly told that we live in a "state of exception,"
or, as Giorgio Agamben has put it:
the state of exception is therefore the principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes possible. As such, the state of exception itself is thus essentially unlocalizable (even if definite spatiotemporal limits can be assigned to it from time to time). 7 Agamben goes on to argue that the concentration camp is the "space that corresponds to the originary structure of the nomos." 8 This nomos, unlike Schmitt's Nomos, is an "unlocalizable zone of indistinction," and is evidence of Agamben's central thesis that the state of exception has become the rule. 9 While paying attention to transformations in the nature of sovereign power is important, we want to probe how bodies feature in juridical encounters with persons who have seemingly been rendered outside law in constituting and sustaining the juridical order. Such persons are often cast as indistinguishable abject bodies -as wholly other, bare life, or beyond the mediation of legal systems. Occasionally, judges deploy tropes, metaphors -or as in the cases we examine here -characters in novels to mark the encounter with a body that must be placed in an imperial historical continuum, but without conceding any substance or quiddity to that person.
Our paradoxical aim, then, in suggesting the emergence of a new nomos "offshore" is precisely to counter the assertion that the exigencies of exceptional sovereign power can account for the placement of bodies inside or outside a territorially determined juridical order. 10 Far from being "unlocalizable," sovereign power operates by attributing signs to bodies whose localization offshore is central to the production of their juridical status and that of the sovereign authority they come in contact with. We seek to displace the sense that land, sea, island -on-and offshore -are matters of fact. By focusing on bodies and their signification through the geographical and juridical formation of islands in the Indian Ocean -in the Chagos Archipelago and on Australia's Christmas Island( Figure 1 ) -we stress that a littoral jurisprudence must pay attention to the terms in which bodies are encountered. There can be no nomos without the signs that mark bodies. Our intention is to open a discussion of the ethics and politics of "bodies as their own signs."
Nomos is the juridicalized combination of animal and human bodies marked in space.
As Cornelia Vismann has argued, this is the "primordial scene of the nomos" which "opens with a drawing of a line in the soil." 11 It is the opening scene of law -initiating a concept of law tied to agriculture, the tilling of soil, a sign of ownership. 12 This economy of cultivating is also "writing by an ox." 13 This is "boustrophedon [ox turning] writing" -a writing that moves like an ox pulling a plough, back and forth, changing direction, mirroring the previous line. 14 Schmitt's opposition between nomos as the concrete order of space and nomos as abstract normativism (Kelsen) is characterized by Vismann as a battleground between jus terrendi and jus scriptum. Our analysis draws particular attention to the jus scriptum. Nomos manifests orders of territorial space and writing. This reflects a tension between land/economy and the writing of figures into and out of a juridical order. But it is also the (animal) "body that marks the soil" and "attests to the human power executed in the land."
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We want to stay with the ox, the many beasts such as the beast of burden pulling the plough.
And it is that relation between the beast and man, beast and sovereign, that we develop below.
The "offshore" is a spatial ordering that carries the primordial scene of nomos into the present. If nomos gives form to the spatial visibility of the social and political order of a people, it is doubtful whether it can be immediate in the sense of not being mediated.
Mediation -and for our purposes, legal mediation and signification -may in fact be the key to a nomos, so that to divide and to pasture would not be material acts alone, but ones that inaugurate a nomos precisely because they are the site of signification. This signification would mark the putting in to relation of beings (human and animal) and the putting into relation of beings in space (as land, ocean, territory).
Through the examination of a series of court rulings, this paper argues that the Anglophone common law is constituting the Indian Ocean as an archive of sovereign violence. Sovereign violence is taken offshore, and thus more readily removed from the reach of judicial review. These offshore sites of sovereign violence become places where certain figures -peoples, individuals -are beneath consideration. That is, they become a space in which individuals or peoples cannot be seen, heard, felt: and in which their insubstantiality comes to define the Indian Ocean and its islands as ghostly, haunted, unfathomable. In fathoming this, we finally argue that, far from being new, this construction of a common law of the Indian Ocean tells us about the affront of an archaic sovereignty that always already determines and is determined by law. 39 Returning to
Defoe's narrative with less expansive and more material intent, we find the island is positioned by a curious mix of vague and specific coordinates. It is somewhere off the Atlantic, within the Caribbean. It is one of a number of islands taking character from their relative position to a mainland coastline that is defined by mention of the mouth of the Orinoco, and the effect of that sweep of water in isolating and connecting shores. 40 It is, in other words, a site that comes to be defined by its place within a region. Notably, this regional sensibility is given to Crusoe (and thence to the reader) by Friday. But this moment comes long after the fuller articulation of the island in other terms.
Shipwrecked on the island, Crusoe quickly determines it is uninhabited in being unpeopled. 41 He conceives himself as a first inhabitant of a terra nullius in ways that are, apparently inevitably, productive of masculine resourcefulness and English law: he builds, he clears, he plants, he crops, he makes and reinvents, even if he does not invent. 42 The narrative famously moves -as much as it does move over those first 24 years of puritan isolationbetween Crusoe's expressions of desperate loneliness, and of triumphant sovereignty as he settles the island. But a major shift in plot and tone occurs when he discovers that the island is not unpeopled in the sense that it is not unused or unvisited by "others." His discovery that groups of local people come to the other side of the island to fight, kill, cook and eat each other leads to the further consolidation of his sovereignty through the building of fortifications. But of course this twist in the register of his anxiety -from anxiety about being alone to anxiety about not being alone -takes a further turn when he rescues a native from a cannibal skirmish, names him Friday, and takes on the white man's burden of teaching him to speak English, to know a Christian God, and to accept Crusoe as his sovereign. But the island as a site for the fulfillment of Crusoe's yearning for companionship through a master/slave dialectic is not all that the narrative yields.
In one of the longer dialogues in the narrative, Friday is not only articulated as a cannibal in need of redemption. While this is what the conversation eventually proves, it does so via an exchange in which Crusoe is eager to discover -and Friday is portrayed as concentrated on conveying -a story of "my Nation in the Place where me was […] in the yonder Place," but that includes a timeless culture of various "Nations" going to "other Place where they think," and that includes coming "hither," to this island. This conversation produces Crusoe's summary description of Friday's more detailed knowledge of distances, "Current and Wind," and his admirable navigational skills that locate the island within a region. 43 That is, being indigenous emerges as a regional term that exceeds the shoreline of a hard-to-reach and hard-to-leave island. This might, of course, reveal Crusoe/Defoe's racist refusal to apprehend important distinctions between local people: while not quite Columbus's "Indians," Crusoe can only manage to understand from Friday that they are all "Caribs." 44 On the other hand, this might also be read pre-emptively against later imperialist strategies to classify and categorize. Tentatively, Friday becomes aboriginal to the extent that he is not of the island that is the central scene of the narrative. His aboriginality is told as the story of his relationship to a place offshore his autochthonous territory. And in this, of course, he is just like Crusoe. For as Crusoe tells us in the first paragraph of his story, he is born Robinson
Kreutznaer to a Bremen father: and as the story unfolds, he becomes English, not through dwelling in England, but through his location within a territory far-offshore Britain. 45 Eventually, of course, this parallel between the (dis)locations of Friday and Crusoe must be absorbed by the master/slave dialectic that operates so irresistibly within and beyond the novel. But even if Friday is finally a slave and a native in the sense that he is available for subjection and in need of enlightenment, he is nonetheless also recognizable as indigenous through Crusoe's narrative appreciation of his understanding of spaces and proximities.
Friday was not born on the island and he was not born to anyone of the island: and so he might continue to complicate what is required to be indigenous in certain situations. That problems of being indigenous -of being of a place, soil, territory, and recognized as such by the relevant community -is one frontier that delimits and defines the province of executive power. The very problem of justice posed by executive action (as appropriation, expulsion, the calculability of national security) comes up against the claims to justice of peoples that are "properly" of a place. It is thus a central technique of archaic sovereign authority to purport to regulate who is a "proper" native.
How long it takes to become indigenous is a fraught and context-specific question.
There may be many and diverse reasons for avoiding it, or for broaching it indirectly or partially. This is exemplified in the WikiLeaks case. As well as arguing an improper motive, the applicants proposed that the Foreign Secretary's declaration of BIOT as a "no-take" (the meaning is literal: nothing can be taken from or to such a zone) MPA was "flawed" because the proposal had failed to disclose that, "in so far as it prohibited all fishing, [it] would adversely affect the traditional and/or historical rights of Chagossians to fish in the waters of their homeland, as both Mauritian citizens and as the native population of the Chagos
Islands." 46 The irony of so many native title claims is played out in the judgment. Richards LJ spends much text considering the argument based on Mauritian claims, rights and licenses.
But he needs only one swift paragraph to conclude that any possible native title to fishing would have been extinguished when the islanders were exiled in the 1960s and 1970s. 47 Both the slightness of the proposal of a native title, and the swiftness with which it is put aside is consonant with the earlier line of cases on the Chagossians' exile from the archipelago.
Within this history, the islanders have fully (dis)appeared as "subjects" of the British
Crown. 48 There have been clear and strong strategic reasons for this. But it has led to an oddly shifty submersion of the character of the islanders as indigenous. Like (but of course not like) the Friday of Crusoe's narrative, the ancestors of the Chagossians came to live on the islands within the colonial period: the islands were uninhabited before the French established a plantation economy and initiated a regional history of forced labor, which was then ceded to the British at the end of the Napoleonic wars. 49 That this history might be too short and too modern to found an indigenous right seems -albeit inadvertently-to emerge from the legal narrative. And so the staunchness with which Richards and Laws LJ's deplore the Chagossians as native in the guise of "Man Fridays" or "Men Fridays" takes on another aspect. It becomes a distraction: a deflection of the potential recognition of the Chagossians as native in their own guise. But in thinking about the instantiations and ramifications of this, we might find ourselves again drawn back to Friday in different guise(s).
In her work on the centrality of "collective narrative and standardized history" in the Chagos Islanders' self-representation, Laura Jeffery considers the power and problems of a plural semantics. 50 She points out that where the Chagossians' articulation of a collective memory had moral force in political and media encounters, it appeared as unreliable and inconsistent in the context of the law's narrower preference for individual eye-witness accounts, and for response over recitation. 51 Any expectation that re-workings of colonial era stories must strive to retrieve ghostly figures from between the lines, from the heart of darkness, from the stasis of Orientalism, and "write back" by lending them more replete life -body, blood, movement, voice -will be baffled by one of the most eminent and studied literary reincarnations of Friday. J. M.
Coetzee's Foe (1986) forcefully demonstrates how his eternal returns mark the impossibility of witnessing and fathoming the figures that lie behind the cipher that is Friday.
Foe has become canonical -as predicted, with some discomfort, by Derek Attridgeas a work of measured refusal, or as K. L. Worthington puts it, as a "masterful portrayal of tactical authorial withdrawal" from the figure of Friday. 53 Both wary and admiring of "that style forever on its guard against itself," Attridge understands that the power of Coetzee's novel lies in the (elite) pain of not coming to terms with the "absolute otherness," the "absolute absence" in the narrative's (non-) representation of Friday. 54 Gayatri Spivak teaches the novel as a "halting" before Friday, who becomes "the wholly other," not mostly through a dialectic with Cruso/Crusoe/Defoe/Foe, but through the more intensive and erotically charged non-dialogue with an incarnation drawn from Defoe's lesser-known novel
Roxana, who appears as the castaway narrator, Susan Barton. 55 Most of Coetzee's novel is in quotation marks, between which Susan tells of her shipwreck and years as a castaway on an island -the island -with "Cruso" and Friday.
Structured around her memoir and the letters she writes to "Mr Foe," the novel's quotation marks ask the reader to question the conditions under which stories are produced. And so the quotation marks also focus the intertextualities of the novel. Alongside Defoe's stories, Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Melville mark the narrative. 56 As Attridge recognizes, writing in relation to a canon "governs the act of writing quite as much as the need for selfexpression or the wish to communicate": a reading of the novel that highlights the ways intertextuality also "drives our self-representations and representations," for "unless we are read, we are nothing." We need to be intelligible signs. 57 Everyday experiences can be represented in order to construct an identity. Charter to "ensure [… the] economic, social and educational advancement" of the residents and to send reports to the Secretary-General. 64 In a persuasive reading of this judgment, T. T. Arvind contends that while Lord Hoffmann uses a regretful rhetoric of formalism, "the actual legal reasoning is so without basis as to be unsustainable on any formalist or legalist account." In Arvind's reading, the rhetoric of formalism "cloaks" an exercise in a "particular sort of judicial pragmatism, of a type to which
[…] the English legal process is particularly susceptible," and which is geared around the House of Lord's disinclination to set "boundaries on the power of the executive." In the 2010 case, one of the plaintiffs argued that the court had a duty to consider the in/validity and/or declare the limits of a power granted under s 46A (2), (3) and (7) of the Migration Act. This section gives the Minister an exclusive and personal power to allow a declared "unlawful non-citizen" to apply for a visa not otherwise accessible by this class of person. (The Plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the Minister had failed in a duty to consider them for such an exercise of power: or, alternatively, that the whole s 46 approach to the "unlawful non-citizen" was invalid.) In other words, the demand was for both a statement of the right to conduct judicial review, and for such a review. The argument referred to the judgment in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW), which states that to deprive a court of its role in declaring and enforcing the limits on executive power "would be to create islands of power immune from supervision and restraint." In a curiously resonant and ironic choice, French CJ constructs his response to the argument around this very phrase -"islands of power." 71 In an effort to be succinct, but barely avoiding tautology in his double-negative,
French CJ "does no more than deny that the particular grant of power entails a duty to consider its exercise." While acknowledging that an exercise of such power would entail the possibility of judicial review, he gives himself room summarily and emphatically to state that "No "island of power" is created." 72 The existence of a sovereign power is almost (but not quite) conjured as a material geography. And of course this is, precisely, the excised territory of Christmas Island. Just as the unacknowledged materiality of Friday haunts Lord
Hoffmann's key reference to Crusoe, the materiality of this individual geography haunts the abstract rhetoric of islandness. Placed together, these ghosts (these haunted matters) allow us to see something absolute and material about the operation of power across the Indian Ocean.
And even further -as the third part of this paper proposes -we can see the judicial retreat from executive action exercised by UK and Australian courts as expressive of the first and final form of sovereignty.
<A>PART III: THE VISIBILITY OF BODIES
In a series of seminars towards the end of his life Jacques Derrida returned to a persistent concern about the distinction between humans and animal -what he termed the difference between "who" (human or sovereign), and "what" beings (animals). The fact that in French "sovereign" and "animal" are respectively denoted through masculine and feminine termsle soverain and la bête -also suggested a further marginalization or difference that required attention. 73 In these seminars the difference between human/animal, masculine/feminine, and sovereign/beast are explored through Crusoe and Friday, as well as between Louis XIV and an elephant, respectively. The visive power of sovereignty involved in the who/what, human/animal distinction -the power to see, to name, to gather knowledge, to possess and comprehend is put into question. 74 Knowledge, theory, and ontology are arranged through these types. Derrida sets out to problematize the separations of what/who, beast/sovereign, feminine/masculine. The disruption has to begin at the level of knowledge, of what it means to know, see, cast one's gaze, have access to an object known, seen, and graspable:
"knowledge is sovereign." 75 One scene of this deconstructive encounter is Crusoe's island: or rather, the act of departure from Crusoe's island.
In order to think about the "irreducible multiplicity" of those other "living beings"
(the non-human; the beast; the other), Derrida writes that "The limit from which […] we need to set out looks like the shores, the contour, of an island in which a Robinsonian man relates to the animal only for himself, with a view to himself, from his point of view, in his beingfor-self." This departure occurs within a long meditation on Crusoe on his island as emblematic of the sovereign, and his definitive reduction of this multiplicity. 76 This figure allows Derrida to think through the "autobiography" of the sovereign as variously bored, distanced, melancholy, longing, and obsessively terrified of certain kinds of death. 77 All these characteristics are approached and re-approached as aspects of the sovereign as definitively alone.
Derrida asks us to consider the difference between the statements "I am alone" and "I am alone with you," and to feel the greater "abyss" -the greater sense of solitude -that inheres in the second statement. 78 This idea recurs and inhabits the sovereign as an "I" who "organizes the economy of his solitude in the company of those, the others, who, as close as can be to him, with him, or even in him […] do not accompany him." 79 In broaching the sovereign's relationship to "the other," Derrida turns to two types of scene/figure in Defoe's narrative: haunting/specters (particularly in the opening of The Farther Adventures) and cannibals/cannibalism ("more other" than the beast). 80 This allows him to understand the shape of the sovereign as a body; and sovereignty as a fearful, and thus lonely, concentration on the owned body in both its materiality, and its potential ghostliness. The beast, says Derrida, is likewise "Robinsonian" in its aloneness. It also is deprived of the company of "the other, of that alterity in general." 81 So what we get from Derrida's engagement with Crusoe on his island is an idea of the sovereign as, like the beast, "poor in world" (that is the island as emblematic of sovereignty), and unaccompanied by the others that accompany and define his sovereignty.
Another scene for the deconstructive encounter with the sovereign, for Derrida, is that of the autopsy or anatomical dissection of an elephant conducted in front of Louis XIV in 1681. 82 The dismemberment of the elephant in front of Louis XIV, and the "precision with which its parts were examined," manifests the macabre conceit of absolute knowledge. It is an event that follows a combat -what Derrida calls an unconsciously amorous and narcissistic seduction, hunt, and capture. 83 It is a phenomenological event in that the elephant appears as an object under the "Sun King's" gaze. 84 The king owns and knows, possesses and has knowledge of the beast for pleasure. This knowledge is mediated by institutions -the anatomy lesson unfolds under the authority of the French Academy of Sciences created by the monarch. This "knowing-power, power-to-know, knowing-how-to-see, and sovereign being-able-to-see is not, fundamentally, revolutionized by the French Revolution." 85 The sovereignty of nation or people in the modern international system is a new form of the same structure. At the heart of the matter is its sovereign mastery over the beast.
The absolute knowledge of the sovereign also extends to history -the sense that everything is known in advance. 86 Derrida draws on Louis Marin's book The Portrait of the King to express the as if, the simulacrum effect or fiction of the sovereign spectacle.
"Absolute knowledge" means that everything happens "as though it were known in advance,"
and thus like a "marionette," programmed and "providentially prescribed." 87 This historiography of the sovereign creates in the reader-spectator "the simulacrum, the illusion, that he is the one who is pulling the strings of the marionette of history." 88 This is the "as if"
central to sovereignty:
Sovereignty is this narrative fiction or this effect of representation. Sovereignty draws all its power, all its potency, i.e. its all powerful nature, from this simulacrum effect, this fiction -or representation -effect that is inherent and congenital to it, as it were co-originary.
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The archaic sovereign ambition, in relation to the issues discussed in this paper, is to treat space and subjects such as Chagossians and boat migrants as marionettes. In the increase of executive authority, and the looming attempts to destroy the remnants of judicial oversight, it is the absolutist power of the puppeteer that is anxiously asserted. Sovereignty as the "pulling been so often and over-determinedly read -primarily prefigure the vast empire to come. It is more fully told as a site divided into and by the settler's private spaces, and it more completely expresses and dwells upon Crusoe's imagined desire to articulate both the particular and the generic nature of his relations with Friday. Thought about this way, it is possible to re-read the references to Friday and Crusoe in the Bancoult cases. They appear less as a rhetorical means by which an ethical resolution is expressed, and more as an inadvertent but powerful summoning of an archaic formulation of intimacy. What haunts the judgments is not so much an old and intimately familiar demand for justice. What haunts the judgment is that it is an old and familiar demand for justice: one that should long ago have been satisfied, or should at least have shifted terms. 93 And so the figuration of Friday and
Crusoe in the judgments becomes uncanny. All too familiar, they appear out of place: they disrupt, and come to signify anxiety more than certainty. Apparently part of a discourse of ethical assurance, the references to Friday and Crusoe discomfort more than they console.
And in this they are consonant with Defoe's writing, in which the ghost is both a disturbance and a consolation. Adventures. While we can see this later narrative traversing Coetzee's novel from the beginning, it is in the short final chapter that it arguably becomes the crucial intertextual sign.
This is because it is this chapter that witnesses Friday in death. And it is in The Farther
Adventures that we are told of Friday's death.
The final part of Coetzee's novel is without quotation marks. This invites us into a more intimate relationship with the narrative. We enter a house (the house is gothic, we are like a ghost) that has a plaque bolted to the wall stating it was the home of "Daniel Defoe,
Author" -which tells us that this is now, the time of the reader. Here we encounter bodies:
perhaps Susan or her daughter, perhaps Cruso/Crusoe or Defoe. This is not certain. The only certainty is the body of Friday. But as the "I" of the narrative has somehow become the reader, the house has somehow become a shoreline; then a boat, the surface of an ocean; and finally a descent into a shipwreck. Friday's body only becomes its "own sign" when the reader dives to find him, slowly turning, at the bottom of the ocean: "But this is not a place of words. Each syllable, as it comes out, is caught and filled with water and diffused. This is a place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of Friday." 100 Rich and provocative as it is, Spivak's much-quoted valuing of Coetzee's rendering of the "body as its own sign" is oddly disembodied from the precise physicalities and geographies of this final scene. In Coetzee's novel, it is crucially only in the place of the most absolute silence -beyond the crowding of voice, story, intertextual reference, historiography, textuality, signs -that the body ensigns itself. It is only at the bottom of the ocean: and the silence here is not the same as the silencing and misapprehensions of Friday that occur within
Crusoe's journal, Susan's memoirs, or the judgments of the UK courts. This is a silence that precisely allows us to attend to -to feel against our "eyelids," "the skin of our face," as the 
